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Abstract: This article deals with the optimal allocation of mine clearance resources to a network of roads that is continually
being mined by an opponent. The motivating application is IED warfare as practiced in Iraq and Afghanistan. The situation differs
from most mine warfare analyses in being protracted indefinitely in time, with the processes of mine placement by Red and mine
clearance by Blue being intermixed. Each incident involving a Blue convoy and a Red mine removes the mine and possibly causes
some damage to the convoy. Blue’s object is to minimize the total damage rate by optimally deploying mine clearance forces to
road segments. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 180–187, 2011
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1. INTRODUCTION
When military forces of one country (or coalition of coun-
tries, hereafter referred to simply as “Blue”) occupy another
country (Green) over a long period of time, it will usually be
necessary for Blue to make regular logistic and tactical use
of Green’s road network. If Green willingly or unwillingly
hosts forces (Red) who are opposed to Blue’s occupation,
then Blue’s necessity represents an opportunity for Red, as
roads can be mined. In this article, a “mine” is simply a sta-
tionary explosive device thatRed can secretly place on, under,
or near a road, to be detonated at some later time when Blue
traffic attempts passage. Blue is assumed to have forces that
attempt to clear these mines, the optimal use of which is the
subject of this article.
The situation described above fits the occupations of Iraq
and Afghanistan by coalitions led by the United States. In
each of those countries, the mines employed by Red are often
improvised from artillery shells or other kinds of munitions.
The resulting mines are usually referred to as Improvised
Explosive Devices, or IEDs [see [1], for a review of the
effectiveness of these devices in Iraq]. The ready availability
of munitions in those countries makes this type of warfare
particularly attractive for Red, but the opportunity would be
there even without them. Land mines are cheap, effective,
and easily transported, so a mine-based attack on Green’s
road network can be expected in any prolonged, opposed
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occupation. This analysis is meant to be general enough to
encompass all such situations.
In a similar situation, DeGregory [3] employs 0/1 inte-
ger programming to optimize allocation of Blue’s protective
resources. The current analysis results in a different objective
function and a nonlinear optimization problem for Blue.
The unit of Blue traffic is taken to be a “convoy,” a group
of vehicles moving in a coordinated fashion. We will use
this terminology even for Blue clearance forces, which are
typically Route Clearance Teams (RCTs) employing special
purpose vehicles and tools. There are no Red convoys—the
term applies only to Blue.
There are multiple reasons for forming traffic into con-
voys, an important one being economy in providing vehicles
such as gun-trucks that protect the convoy from threats other
than mines, notably small arms fire. The reason that most
directly affects our modeling is the possible provision of
convoy “escorts” whose function is to directly precede the
rest of the convoy, finding and removing Red mines before
they can be effectively detonated. This possibility affects our
modeling because the convoy’s escorts might be composed
of forces that could otherwise be performing general purpose
road clearance, which we call “clearance forces” to distin-
guish them from escorts. Clearance forces pursue their object
without reference to the schedule of any particular convoy.
It is the optimal employment of clearance forces that is the
object of the model introduced latter. Escorted convoys are
simply one particular type of Blue traffic, and the effect of the
escorts will be reflected in the parameters that characterize
the type.
© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
We make four basic assumptions about the Blue versus
Red battle on Green’s roads:
1. Indefiniteness: The battle is assumed to proceed
indefinitely, with no time limit. Every mine placed
on a road will eventually be involved in an incident
with some kind of Blue traffic. This would not be the
case if there were no Blue traffic at all, in which case
mineswould accumulate pointlessly on the roads, but
such scenarios are of no interest.
2. Logistic Ineffectiveness: Red’s efforts are assumed
to have a negligible effect on Blue’s logistic oper-
ations. Although the damage done to Blue convoys
may be a significant issue for Blue, the convoys per-
form their logistic function regardless of damage.
When attacked by amine, a Blue convoy simply con-
tinues with its mission, and may even be attacked on
multiple occasions. The analytical effect of this is
that, in quantifying the probability that a particular
mine damages a particular Blue convoy, we will pay
no attention to the possibility that other mines might
have already damaged the convoy.
3. Independence: The various types of Blue traffic and
the Red process of placing mines on roads are all
assumed to be time-homogeneousPoissonprocesses,
with all Red processes being independent of all Blue
processes, and with all processes of any color being
independent of each other on any given segment.
The significant part of this assumption is Red–Blue
independence. We assume that Red does not employ
tactics such as watching a road segment until a RCT
passes, and then rushing out to place a mine in its
wake. Red is assumed to be ignorant of Blue’s traffic
schedules, except for the overall level of the various
kinds of Blue traffic (including RCTs). The verity of
the Red–Blue independence assumption is arguable
and perhaps significant, but we do not intend to argue
the point in this article. The time-homogeneous part
of the assumption permits the derivation of some sim-
ple formulas below, and is probably less arguable —
the levels of both Red and Blue processes have fluc-
tuated in Iraq, but with a time constant (months) that
is long compared with the decision cycle of either
side.
4. Scalar damage: We assume that all types of damage
due to mines (vehicles lost, vehicles damaged, cargo
lost, men killed, men wounded, and so on) can be
put on one scale called “damage.” Blue’s goal is to
minimize it.
For generality, we acknowledge several types of mines,
indexed by j , as well as several types of Blue traffic, indexed
by i. One type of traffic might be RCTs, whereas another
might be logistic traffic, and yet another might be troop
convoys. The mine types might include buried bombs and
roadside bombs, as in Iraq.
We will eventually also need an index k for the road seg-
ment, but first consider only one road segment. As the battle
is imagined to be indefinite in time, most data is in terms of
rates per unit time. For the subject road segment, let
xj = rate at which Red places mines of type j on the
segment
yi = rate atwhichBlue traffic of type i uses the segment,
in units of convoy passages over the segment per
unit time
The same letters in bold type will stand for collections
of all such quantities. In accordance with assumption 3, the
components of x and y are assumed to be the rate parameters
of independent Poisson processes. Blue controls y with the
object of minimizing the total damage rate.
The various types ofBlue traffic differ quantitatively, rather
than qualitatively. Like clearance convoys, logistic convoys
can remove mines, and like logistic convoys, clearance con-
voys are subject to damage. We define the word “incident”
to correspond to the removal of an emplaced mine, without
regard to whether the causative agent suffers damage. If the
mine is of type j and the removal is caused by a convoy of
type i, thenwewill say that the incident is of type (i, j ). Some
incidents result in damage to Blue and some do not. Let the
(i, j ) incident probability be
βij = probability that the passage of one type i convoy
results in the removal of one given mine of type
j , with or without damage to the type i convoy.
We emphasize that the definition applies to every individ-
ualmine of type j that is currently placedon the road segment,
rather than to the collection of such mines as a whole. The
“given mine” in the definition of βij might be thought of as a
test mine of type j that is placed on the road segment to see
how long it remains there before removal, and what the cause
of removal is. The placement of such a mine initiates a con-
tinuous time Markov process in which the various types of
blue traffic all contribute to its removal. The rate of removal
by traffic of type i is yiβij , and the total rate of removal is
µj ≡∑i yiβij . As this removal rate applies simultaneously
to every mine of type j that is still alive (emplaced but not
yet removed) on the segment, the number of type j mines
still alive is an M/M/∞ queue with input rate xj and ser-
vice rate µj . The expected value of the number of mines of
type j still alive is therefore xj/µj . When a mine of type
j is removed, the probability that the removal is by type i
traffic is given by yiβij /µj , the ratio of the removal rate by
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type i traffic to the total removal rate. All of these results are
consequences of general theorems pertaining to independent
Poisson processes and continuous time Markov chains [5,9].
When an incident happens, the damage done to Blue is
assumed to depend on the mine type and the traffic type:
dij = expected value of the damage to Blue in an (i, j )
incident
As every mine will eventually be involved in an incident of
some kind, the total expected rate of damage suffered by Blue
on the subject road segment is a summation of terms, each
of which is the product of three factors: the mine placement
rate xj , the probability that a mine of type j is removed in
an incident of type (i, j ) as developed in the previous para-
graph, and the damage dij caused by such a removal. The




xjdij (yiβij /µj ). (1)
As xj/µj is the expected value of the number of type j mines
still alive in the aforementioned M/M/∞ queue, Eq. (1) can
also be seen to be the sum of (number of mines) × (incident
rate per mine) × (damage per incident), to the same effect.
If mines are subject to removal by activities unrelated to
Blue’s use of Green’s roads, the effect can be handled by
introducing a background type of traffic (i = 0, say) for
which the product y0β0j represents the background rate of
removal of each mine of type j . Only the product of the two
factors is significant, as Blue will not be in control of y0. The
effect is to give each mine of type j a lifetime of 1/(y0β0j ),
even in the absence of other Blue traffic.
Because of assumption 2, extending the analysis to multi-
ple road segments is simply a matter of adding an additional
subscript k to all of the parameters and variables. Thus we
define µjk ≡ ∑i yikβijk to be the clearance rate of type j
mines on segment k, etc. The final grand total damage rate on
all segments is (writing out the expression for µjk , and using








It is Blue’s object to minimize this quantity, subject to what-
ever constraints on y apply. Equation (2) is true because
the expected value of a sum is the sum of expected val-
ues, whether or not the random variables being summed are
independent. The verity of (2) does not require independence
between Blue traffic of type i on segment k and blue traffic of
type i on neighboring segments (that assumption is unlikely
to be true, and is carefully excluded from assumption 3).
It is worth emphasizing that Blue’s object in assigning
mine clearance teams is not to maximize the rate of remov-
ing mines. Indeed, the rate of removing mines is the same as
the rate at which Red places them on roads, as every mine is
removed by Blue traffic of one kind or another. The object is
instead to adjust y so that mines are removed by traffic that
is unlikely to be damaged in doing so, typically by RCTs.
The ultimate damage rate suffered by Blue depends on
many things other than the allocation of clearance teams.
Blue may be able to influence x by attacking the Red process
that acquires and deploys mines. He may also be able to
reduce βijk by jamming the radio transmitters that are some-
times used to detonate IEDs. He may also be able to reduce
dijk by armoring vehicles. All of these Blue tactics are poten-
tially important, but they do not obviate the need for clearance
teams. Formula (2) could be used to assess the effectiveness
of each of them, but our interest here is only in the dependence
of z on x and y.
In our model, z is proportional to x. Should Red manage
to double all components of x, then the damage suffered by
Blue will also double. Should x become sufficiently large,
then assumption 2 will eventually become untenable, but
until that happens, scalar factors multiplying x are tactically
insignificant as far as clearance teams are concerned.
3. MINIMIZING TOTAL DAMAGE
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing
total damage, subject to constraints on y, for a given value of
x (we will consider a game where Red controls x in Section
4, but x is simply data in this section). Some components
of y will not be controllable. For such traffic types i, yik is
given for all k. Otherwise, assume for the moment that the
only constraint is that the total amount of controllable traffic
of type i must not exceed Ci convoys per unit time:∑
k
yik ≤ Ci , for all controllable i. (3)
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose there are two types of traffic tra-
versing two road segments and Red uses only one type of
mine. Type 1 traffic is controllable RCTs, which are assumed
to be invulnerable to mines (so d111 = d112 = 0). Type 2
traffic is vulnerable logistic traffic, which is not controllable
(so y21 and y22 are given traffic levels). We take βijk to be 1
in all cases. There are only two nonzero terms in (2), and the
expression reduces to
z = x11d211
1 + y11/y21 +
x12d212
1 + y12/y22 . (4)
As y21 and y22 are not controllable, the only variables in (4)
are the two clearance effort levels y11 and y12, which should
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Figure 1. Fraction of effort devoted to the first segment when the
logistic traffic levels on two segments are 2 and 1, respectively, ver-
sus total clearance effort. Unless the total effort exceeds 0.5, all
effort should be devoted to clearing the segment with less logistic
traffic.
be selected by Blue to minimize z, subject to (3). The numer-
ator of each term can be thought of as a “default” rate of
damage to traffic on that road segment that applies when no
clearance effort is allocated. The denominator is a reduction
factor that increases linearly with effort.
The default rate of damage does not depend on the logis-
tic traffic level—if there were no clearance effort, damage to
Bluewould depend entirely onRed’s ability to placemines on
roads. The logistic traffic level instead affects the efficiency
of clearance, with high traffic levels making clearance diffi-
cult. Because of this feature, given two road segments that
are identical except for logistic traffic levels, and given only a
small amount of clearance effort, that small amount should be
devoted entirely to the segment with the least logistic traffic,
a conclusion that may be counterintuitive.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of total effort that should be
devoted to segment 1 when x11 = x12 = 1, d211 = d212 = 1,
y21 = 2 and y22 = 1. If the total effort is 0.5, segment 2
should get all of the effort and the total damage rate will be
1 + 2/3 = 1.67. One might expect the optimal clearance
effort on each segment to be proportional to the logistic traf-
fic level. If clearance effort was allocated using that principle,
then we would maintain the ratio y11/y12 = 2, regardless of
total clearance effort, and the curve in Fig. 1 would be flat at
a height of 2/3. For a total effort of 0.5, the total damage rate
would be z = 6/7+ 6/7 = 1.71, as can be seen by substitut-
ing y11 = 1/3 and y12 = 1/6 into (4). Although 1.71 is not
that much larger than 1.67, this example still demonstrates
that the proportionality principle is not a reliable guide to
effort allocation. There are two competing effects going on.
One is diminishing returns as the allocation of effort to a given
segment is increased and the other is “competition” from
logistic traffic. When the total clearance effort is small, the
second effect is dominant and all effort goes to the segment
where competition is least.
Another way of resolving the counterintuitive nature of
Example 1 is to recall the naval maxim that “every ship gets
to be aminesweeper once.” In this sense, heavy logistic traffic
does its own clearance.
The objective function (2) is a convex function of y in
Example 1, but this is not true in general. If the objec-
tive function is not convex, there may be local optima that
are not global. The next two examples illustrate when such
difficulties can be expected.
EXAMPLE 2: Reconsider Example 1, except make y21 =
y22 = 1; that is, logistic traffic is at unit level on both seg-
ments. Also make x11 = x12 = 1 and d211 = d212 = 1, so
both segments have identical parameters. The “RCT” curve
in Fig. 2 shows total damage z as a function of y11 when there
are two units of clearance effort in total and y12 = 2 − y11.
This curve is a convex function with a unique minimum at
y11 = 1. The optimal clearance plan treats both segments
equally. This is not surprising, since both segments have
identical parameters.
EXAMPLE 3: The same as Example 2, except that RCT
effort is fixed at 1 on each segment, while logistic traffic is
controllable, subject to totaling 2 convoys per unit time. The
problem is now to allocate logistic traffic to the two seg-
ments (imagine a source connected to a sink by two parallel
segments), rather than RCT effort. Total damage as a func-
tion of the logistic traffic on the first segment is shown as
the concave curve in Fig. 2. Even though the two segments
are identical, the optimal solution puts all logistic traffic on
one segment, rather than split between the two, with the only
local extremum being a maximum, rather than a minimum.
Figure 2. The RCT curve shows total damage when clearance
effort is controllable, subject to totaling 2, and there is unit logis-
tic traffic on each of two segments. The Logistic curve shows total
damage when logistic traffic is controllable, but clearance effort is
not.
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Example 3 is an implausible model of reality, given our
expectation that route clearance effort will be controllable
rather than logistic traffic. However, it does serve to make
the point that z in Eq. (2) is not necessarily a convex func-
tion of the controllable part of y, and that local optima may
not be global. In problems where the controllable part of y
represents traffic that is itself subject to damage from mines,
as is often true in the dangerous business of mine clearance,
there may be multiple local extrema, some of which are actu-
ally maxima, with the global minimum possibly being on a
boundary. All of these difficulties occur in Example 3, but
none of them occur when controllable traffic is invulnera-
ble, as in Examples 1 and 2. When there are no controllable
variables in the numerators of (4), the objective function is
convex, and all local optima are global [2].
All of the above examples employ the simple constraint (3)
on y. More generally, we might require that y be an element
of some given convex set C, rather than simply constrain the
total amount of effort. This might be useful if controllable
traffic had a home base(s) located in a network, so that travel
over certain segments forces travel over others. See Wash-
burn andWood [12] for an example of such a formulation. The
resultingminimization problem is well suited to optimization
packages such as Excel’s Solver ( [6], see Appendix), or in
larger problems tomore capable packages such asGAMS [8].
As long as every controllable component of y represents an
invulnerable type of Blue traffic, all local optima are global.
4. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF DAMAGE
MINIMIZATION
In the minimization problem considered in Section 3, x is
a known quantity when Blue chooses y. The usual context for
this view is that x can be observed repeatedly in successive
periods, with y being adjusted in each period to be optimal
against the most recently observed x. There is a long history
of the use of this point of view in analyzing warfare [7], and
we intend it to be the principal one here. One of its main
advantages is that the logistic situation faced by Red in plac-
ing mines on roads does not have to be understood by Blue
— it suffices to observe the results of Red’s efforts. Nonethe-
less, if Red has an information advantage over Blue, there is
something to be said for the point of view that Red will in
effect know ywhen determining x, and will choose x to max-
imize total damage. This alternative viewpoint is explored in
this section.
It is still Blue’s object to choose y to minimize total dam-
age, but now he must do so in the knowledge that Red, once
he knows y, will respond with the worst possible value for x.











This suits our purpose because all of the dependence on y is
incorporated in ajk(y), and ajk(y) does not depend on x.
As Red chooses x to maximize total damage, we need to
make an assumption about the constraints that Red faces in
doing so. We assume a simple constraint where each mine
of type j placed on road segment k costs cjk , and Red has a
certain budget available for placingmines of all types.Within
this cost structure, Red’s best option is to choose a mine type
and segment for which the ratio ajk(y)/cjk is maximized,
the maximum bang-per-buck. This is true regardless of Red’s
budget limitation, as long as it is small enough to preserve the
plausibility of the assumption regarding logistic ineffective-
ness, so Blue does not need to knowRed’s budget in choosing
y. Blue’s problem is to make sure that the maximum bang-
per-buck ratio (call it r) is as small as possible. Thus, Blue’s
problem is to
minimize r , subject to ajk(y) ≤ rcjk
for all j , k, and y ∈ C. (7)
where C is the set that constrains y, possibly (3). The vari-
ables in (7) are r and y. The constraints are to the effect that
the bang-per-buck ratio cannot exceed r for any (j , k), thus
assuring that r has the desired meaning.
Solutions of (7) sometimes involve large amounts of clear-
ance effort being spent on segments where Blue is not very
effective at clearance—even if ajk(y) is difficult to make
small, (7) requires that it must be made smaller than rcjk .
Solutions of (7) will therefore sometimes differ significantly
from solutions of (2). A specific example will be considered
in Example 4 below, and Washburn [11] includes additional
examples.
The mathematical program (7) is generally nonlinear
because of the ratio that defines ajk(y) in (5). If the numer-
ator of (5) were a constant, however, as it would be if only
uncontrollable trafficwere vulnerable tomines, then (7) could
be reduced to a linear program where the reciprocal of r is
maximized. Again, we see that problems where controllable
traffic is invulnerable to mines are essentially simpler than
problems in general.
One could also imagine a two-person zero-sum game
where the payoff function is (6), with player 1 (Red) control-
ling x and player 2 (Blue) controlling y. As (6) is a concave
(in fact linear) function of x, the value of that game is the
same as its max min value [10]. However, there is little to
recommend this game theoretic point of view because Blue’s
minimizing strategy will in general be mixed, and it is hard to
imagine how Blue could maintain the secrecy of his strategy
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
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over a long period of time, or even maintain the meaning of
y as a collection of Poisson process rates. The more defen-
sible, larger min max value is determined by (7), except that
the optimal r needs to be multiplied by Red’s budget to find
the damage ultimately suffered by Blue. The minimizing y
does not need to be a secret in the min max problem, and its
constancy in time permits the usual Poisson interpretation.
5. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The parameters used in specifying the model of Section 2
will not usually be directly observable byBlue. In this section,
we show how they can be estimated using measurements
associatedwith current operations. It is easiest to imagine that
all data are gathered over some initial test period of length
T during which traffic levels of all types remain constant.
Suppose we measure, for all i, j , and k,
Bijk = number of incidents of type (i, j ) on segment k
over the period
Dijk = total damage from incidents of type (i, j ) on
segment k over the period




iBijk is the total observed number of type j
mines removed from segment k over the time period. The
expected number of mines placed on the segment according
to the model is xjkT . If T is long enough that the two can







This is our estimate of the rate at which mines are placed on
the segment. Similarly, an estimate of dijk is
dijk = Dijk/Bijk , (9)
the average damage per incident of type (i, j ) on segment k.
Finally, let Mjk =∑iβijkYik . The expected number of (i, j )
incidents on segment k over a period of length T , according
the model, is xjkT βijkYikMjk , which should be roughly equal to





Using Eqs. (8), (9), and (10), we can now write the formula


























The second equality in Eq. (11) is obtained by substituting
Eq. (8) for xjk and cancelling common factors. The result is
a formula for the damage to be expected over a time period
of length T , as a function of observable parameters and the
as yet undetermined variables y.
The length of the observation period T does not appear on
the right-hand-side of Eq. (11), and is therefore irrelevant to
the optimization of y. However, theremay be statistical issues
if some of the observed data consists of small integers. This
is most likely to be the case in estimating dijk , the damage per
incident of type (i, j ) on segment k, as the numerator Dijk in
Eq. (9) might very well be 0 on some road segments. If there
is no reason to suspect damage per incident to depend on the












and then derive an expression for zT on the basis that every

















where dij is given by Eq. (12). Other kinds of aggregation
might also be called forwhenT is small, or considerBayesian
techniques [4].
Two points are worth noting about the equation for zT ,
whether Eqs. (11) or (13). The first is that, if index i cor-
responds to an uncontrollable type of Blue traffic, then Yik
does not need to be known because yik will necessarily be the
same as Yik , and only the ratio is needed. This is important
because the levels of uncontrollable Blue traffic may very
well be unknown. The second point is that, as long as no
damage has been done to any kind of controllable traffic over
the test period, Eqs. (11) and (13) are both convex functions
of the controllable part of y. As long as y is constrained to be
in any convex set, all local minima will therefore be global.
The implied use ofmeasurements such as these is thatmea-
sured data, including x, is assumed to be constant over some
period in the future, even if y changes. An alternative point
of view is that xwill be chosen as an optimal countermeasure
to y, as described in Section 4. In that case Eq. (8) must be
replaced by the constraints that Red faces in determining x.
EXAMPLE 4: As in Example 1, there is only one kind of
mine and two kinds of blue traffic: vulnerable logistic traffic
is Type 2 and invulnerable RCT traffic is Type 1. However,
the data shown in the first four rows of Table 1 is realistic data
collected in Iraq for eight road segments during one 17-week
period in 2007-8. The mines are all IEDs, and every attack by
an IED is classified as either “effective” or “ineffective.” The
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Table 1. Analysis of an eight-segment road network in Iraq over a 17-week period.
Segments (k)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Totals
D21k 8 10 9 4 4 2 8 5 50
B21k 31 38 42 41 32 10 19 41 254
B11k 73 58 51 41 39 18 34 76 390
Yk 965 819 983 908 848 87 37 85 4,732
yk 1,085 1,123 1,001 307 425 186 286 319 4,732
D21k (revised) 7.36 8.17 8.91 5.98 5.51 1.15 1.51 1.79 40.38
first row of data counts the number of effective attacks on
logistic traffic for each segment. The second row is the num-
ber of incidents involving logistic traffic and the third row
is the number of incidents involving RCTs (every incident
by definition removes exactly one IED). The total effort in
Row 4 is 4732 RCT-hours. The last two rows show the fore-
cast results if the same total effort is optimally distributed
over the segments in a subsequent 17-week period where the
segments see the same number of IEDs, using Eq. (11) for
parameter estimation. Roughly speaking, the optimal alloca-
tion takesRCT-hours away fromSegments 4 and 5 to increase
the allocations to 6, 7, and 8. The overall result is to decrease
the number of effective attacks from50 to 40.38, a decrease of
about 19% (this result, as well as others in this section, were
obtained using the spreadsheet described in the Appendix).
If Eq. (13) is used for parameter estimation instead of
Eq. (11), we observe a smaller redistribution of RCT-hours
and a smaller decrease to 43.46 effective attacks over the 17-
week period. Formula Eq. (9) has the fraction of attacks that
are effective on Segment 7 being 8/19, the largest of all the
segments, a fact that is exploited when Eq. (11) is used to
allocate RCT hours. When Eq. (9) is replaced by Eq. (12), all
of the segments have the same fraction of effective attacks,
and the benefits of redistribution are reduced.
During the 17-week period, there were eight effective
attacks out of 53 IEDs placed on segment 7, so the num-
ber of effective attacks per IED on that segment (call it
the segment’s “productivity”) is 8/53 = 0.15. From Red’s
viewpoint, Segment 7 is the most productive segment. If all
254 + 390 = 644 IEDs used over the period had been placed
on that segment, there would have been 644× 8/53 = 97.21
effective attacks, according to our model, rather than only
50. To guard against such disasters in the future, Blue might
choose y tominimize the largest productivity among the eight
segments. This is equivalent to solving Eq. (7)with the cost of
an IED being the same on all segments. In this example, min-
imizing the largest productivity leads to all segments having
the same productivity, namely, 0.0755. The worst case dam-
age is then 0.0755×644 = 48.65, considerably smaller than
97.21. Unfortunately, the damage is still 48.65 even if Red’s
habits do not in fact change in the future, whereas it can be
reduced to 40.38 if Red’s lethargy can be successfully pre-
dicted. The allocations resulting from the two different points
of view can be seen to differ significantly.
The potential impact of force level changes can be assessed
by changing the number of RCT hours available. If force
levels are doubled, for example, so that 9464 hours are
available over a 17-week period, and then optimally distrib-
uted, the number of effective attacks decreases from 40.38 to
25.61. Such computations might be of use in allocating RCT
resources between different areas of operations within Iraq,
or even between Iraq and other theaters.
We have two reasons for basing Example 4 on real data.
One is to make it clear that RCT allocations made in the
absence of an effectiveness model can differ substantially
from optimality. The other is to enable one final comment
about using our model, or any other model that depends on
similar inputs. Incidents that result in the removal of an IED
happen in well defined places at well defined times, and are
therefore relatively easy to keep track of. This accounts for
D21k, B21k, and B11k in table 1, but not Yk . Keeping track of
Yk requires a system for recording RCT patrols that is wide-
spread and uniform enough to permit aggregation of effort
over road segments and military units. As of this writing
(early 2009), such a system does not exist in Iraq. The data
in that row of Table 1 were obtained only after a significant
investment ofman-hours in recalling the history of those eight
road segments over one specific period of time, and may very
well be erroneous in spite of that effort. Partly because of lack
of information about Yk , no system of allocating RCT hours
optimally has ever been employed in Iraq, either within or
between theaters, to our knowledge. Organizationally speak-
ing, the first priority in developing a procedure that will
optimally and regularly allocate clearance effort over a large
region is to institute a procedure for keeping track of past
clearance effort.
6. SUMMARY
We have introduced a simple model of mine warfare as
practiced over a long time period on a network of roads.
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In spite of its fundamental simplicity, the model sometimes
leads to counterintuitive conclusions, particularly when the
forces that clear mines are themselves vulnerable. In partic-
ular, it is not necessarily true that clearance effort should be
proportional to logistic traffic levels.
Much depends on the extent to which Red’s behavior frus-
trates Blue’s attempts to minimize the total damage rate. We
have investigated twoextremecases: Section3 covers the case
where Red’s behavior is stable in the face of Blue’s adjust-
ments of clearance effort, whereas Section 4 covers the case
where Red’s behavior is the worst possible reaction to Blue’s
adjustments. The truth is no doubt somewhere in between.
Given the choice of the two extremes, we favor the first
because it does not require assumptions about the constraints
faced by Red in finding the worst possible reaction.
No model will be of any use unless the data required for
estimating its parameters are available. Estimation of data
based on observable quantities is covered in Section 5. The
quantities that must be observed include Yk , the amount of
clearance effort applied to road segment k over some time
period. Any system such as ours for optimally allocating
clearance effort on a regular basis must include a provision
for keeping track of Yk , in addition to incident-based data.
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APPENDIX
A Microsoft Excel [6] workbook named MineRoad1.xls that implements
some of the calculations discussed earlier can be downloaded from the
“Downloads” link at http://faculty.nps.edu/awashburn/. It has five sheets,
the first three of which deal with Example 4. The optimization engine is
Excel’s Solver.
• Sheet “Iraq(1)” implements (11) in Example 4.
• Sheet “Iraq(2) implements (13) in Example 4.”
• Sheet “Iraq(3)” implements (7), a game theory analysis of Example
4 with cjk = 1 for all (j , k).
• Sheet “2by3by4” implements (2) for the case where there are two
traffic types, three mine types, and four segments. Both traffic types
can be vulnerable, depending on inputs. As distributed, Solver has
found a local optimum that is not global — a better y is (0,0,4,0).
• Sheet “Figure 1” is the source of Fig. 1.
• Sheet “Figure 2” is the source of Fig. 2.
The workbook is a suitable way for the reader to experiment with his own
variants of Examples 1–4, or with problems entirely of his own invention.
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